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1 Introduction
In their seminal articles, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) argue that incentive
conflicts between equity and debt holders increase the firm’s cost of debt. A solution proposed
by Myers (1977) and Smith and Warner (1978) to overcome this problem is to restrict the
actions of a firm’s equityholders by adding debt covenants. The commitment value of these
covenants comes at the cost of reduced flexibility for the firm. This may force the firm to forgo
value-increasing investment projects (Chava and Roberts (2008)) unless these covenants are
waived or removed. In contrast to privately held loans, removing or renegotiating public bond
covenants is extremely difficult (Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Bradley and Roberts (2003)).
One reason for this is the Trust Indenture Act (TIA) of 1939 that requires the consent of the
holders of two thirds of the principal amount of outstanding debt to modify a covenant (Smith
and Warner (1978)). Indeed, Bradley and Roberts (2003) state “public debt issues contain
covenants that are virtually impossible to negotiate and especially to renegotiate.” This view
is shared by Bolton and Jeanne (2007) and Brunner and Krahnen (2008) who demonstrate
that debt renegotiation is more complex when there are many lenders involved.
In this paper we show that one way to alleviate the incentive problem between debt and
equity without foregoing investment opportunities is to grant the issuer an option to remove
covenants ex post (covenant defeasance). The option’s strike price is to be chosen optimally so
that covenants are only removed when it is efficient. We present a theoretical model to analyze
the role of this defeasance option in bond contracts and provide empirical evidence that such
options are included in more than 60% of all US corporate bond issues. We document that
investors are willing to pay a premium of 13-25 basis points for defeasable bonds. This amounts
to an annual saving of about US $1m per year on average, implying savings of US $11m over
the lifetime of an average bond.
Ideally one would like to design debt covenants that allow firms flexibility to pursue all
value-increasing investments while ensuring that equity holders do not take actions detrimental
to bondholders. In practice, however, it is not easy to distinguish between the two. Imagine
a firm that wants to sell some of its assets. Such asset sale is beneficial to all parties in some
states of the world but detrimental to bondholders in some other states. A covenant that
forbids asset sale altogether would protect the lender from potential risk-shifting. The firm
would trade off valuable investment opportunities since violation of the covenant would trigger
default. If there were verifiable signals that could identify states in which asset sales would
compromise a lender’s interest, then this tradeoff can be reduced by making the asset sale
covenant contingent on these signals. However, it is often the case that no meaningful interim
signal is available to predict opportunistic behavior by the issuer. Then the lender may have
no choice but to demand unconditional covenants from the borrower. These covenants may
prohibit asset sales, new debt issues and dividend payments. Such non-contingent covenants
are frequently included in public bond issues. Using these covenants, however, results in value
losses since the firm may have to forgo valuable investment opportunities ex post.
In this paper we study a mechanism that may help to alleviate the problems of non-
contingent covenants. The basic idea for our model is as follows: to reduce its cost of capital,
a firm might give certain control rights to a financier. The firm would prefer to transfer state-
contingent control rights. However, if there is no verifiable interim signal to identify the states
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of the lender’s concern, then the issuer may have to grant the financier unconditional control
rights. If the firm wants to implement a value increasing investment later, the “owners” of
these control rights will be able to capture the surplus associated with this investment, as they
can hold up the firm ex post. However, if the issuer is granted an appropriately structured
option ex ante to take control ex post, then this hold-up problem can be overcome. The option,
if properly designed, will be exercised only in states in which the investment opportunity is
value-increasing. By giving a firm the option to take back control, non-contingent control
rights can be made state-contingent even when no interim signals are available. We show that
(i) with such an option, a firm is willing to give away more control rights (covenants) to the
financier; (ii) the exercise price will be set to ensure that the option is exercised only when
doing so is efficient; (iii) it is not be optimal to include this option for all issuers; (iv) issuers
of debt with a defeasance option will be charged lower rates by lenders.
We examine empirical evidence for the use of such options. We use the Fixed Income
Securities Database (FISD) to look at all US corporate bonds issues over 1989 - 2006. More
than 90% of all issues contain at least one covenant. Almost all bond covenants that we
observe are negative covenants, i.e. non-contingent covenants that restrict certain actions by
issuers, such as asset sales and additional debt issuance. We find that more than 60% of all
US corporate bonds include option style provisions that closely resemble those analyzed in our
model. These options (called covenant defeasance clauses) allow the bond issuer to remove
covenants, as predicted by our model. The price to be paid for defeasance is a sum of cash
or US government securities equal to the remaining outstanding coupon and principal. This
amount has to be placed in an escrow account with a trustee, essentially making the issue
risk-free. This is consistent with our prediction that the option needs to be costly so that
it will not be exercised opportunistically. We also find, in line with the model, that not all
corporate bonds include this option. Those that do exhibit characteristics predicted by our
model. We further document that issues with defeasance options include more covenants than
those without. This finding supports our theory that a covenant defeasance option in the
contract induces the firm to give away more control rights to the financier.
When we examine the impact of the defeasance option in the data on bond yields we find
that the inclusion of defeasance leads to a 13-25 basis points reduction of yields. We include
several robustness checks to test whether underwriters include defeasance in a boiler-plate
fashion and find that this is not the case. Since a borrower’s ability to call the issue without
restrictions could act as a substitute for defeasance, we examine the conditions under which
these issues are callable. We report that 65% of all issues that include a defeasance provision
in our sample are also callable. We find that these issues either have to be called at a premium
over par or have an initial quiet period and thus are not perfect substitutes for defeasance.
Hence in the context of our sample callability is an option on interest rates, while defeasance
is an option on covenants.
The importance of defeasance options has been highlighted in a recent paper by Kahan
and Rock (2009) on contemporary hedge fund activism. The authors demonstrate the recent
emergence of a class of hedge funds that acquire public bonds in anticipation of opaque viola-
tions of negative covenants by issuers and then enforce those covenants at significant profits.
The authors argue that prior to this contemporary hedge fund activism there has been under-
enforcement of negative covenants by the trustees of public bonds. Kahan and Rock (2009)
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predict that the stricter enforcement of negative covenants in public bonds by hedge funds will
result in more defeasance option exercise by issuers in advance of a negative covenant violation
and a higher usage of defeasance options in public bond contracts.
Johnson, Pari, and Rosenthal (1989) and Hand, Huhges, and Sefcik (1990) investigate
the use “in-substance defeasance”on bond and equity prices. “In-substance defeasance”is a
situation where the bond issuer does not have a defeasance option but places securities with
a trustee in order to mimic regular defeasance. This type of defeasance does not free the firm
from any covenants but may improve balance sheet ratios. Both find positive reactions of bond
prices to “in-substance defeasance”but no movement in equity prices.
Our theory builds on Aghion and Bolton (1992), Aghion and Tirole (1997), Fluck (1998) and
Chemla, Habib, and Ljungqvist (2007). In their pioneering article, Aghion and Bolton (1992)
establish that contingent control rights can increase a firm’s pledgeable income and alleviate
the conflict between shareholders and bondholders. Extending the their work, Aghion and
Tirole (1997) demonstrates how multiple control rights can be optimally allocated between
an agent and a principal. Chemla, Habib, and Ljungqvist (2007) illustrates how particular
allocations of multiple control rights can increase a firm’s pledgable income and enable it to
raise venture capital financing. For unconditional control rights, Fluck (1998) shows that
granting the financier such rights can further increase a firm’s pledgeable income but only if
the contract is of indefinite maturity. In this paper we demonstrate that when the issuer holds
a defeasance option, granting the financier unconditional control rights can increase a firm’s
pledgeable income even when the contract has a specific expiration date. We also expand on
Aghion and Tirole (1997) and show how the number of control rights assigned to the principal
can be made endogenous.
The fact that loan and bond covenants influence a firm’s strategy is well documented by
Chava and Roberts (2008) and Billet, King, and Mauer (2007). Chava and Roberts (2008)
show how capital investment decreases sharply following the violation of a positive covenant
(a covenant specifying a threshold level for net worth, interest coverage or some financial
ratio), in particular, for firms with more severe agency problems. Unlike the positive covenants
common in bank loans most bond covenants are so-called negative or action-limiting covenants
(these covenants forbid the firm to take certain actions, such as asset sales, mergers, dividend
payments). In this paper we focus on the impact of negative or action-limiting covenants
in bonds and document how defeasance options can alleviate the underinvestment problem
associated with these covenants.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and Hermalin and Katz (1991) model the impact of renego-
tiation on outcomes. Aghion and Rey (1994) show how renegotiation design can influence the
efficiency of outcome. Garleanu and Zwiebel (2008) explicitly model bond covenants and show
that under asymmetric information more covenants are allocated to bondholders than under
symmetric information. The costs of technical violations of covenants can be quite substantial
for firms and can be between 0.84 to 1.63% of a firm’s market value according to Beneish and
Press (1993). These costs are a lower bound as technical violations are followed by inclusion of
more restrictive covenants. Roberts and Sufi (2009) show that bank loans are frequently rene-
gotiated and emphasize the fact that covenants can determine parties’ outside options during
renegotiation. Our contribution is to show a mechanism to efficiently remove some features
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of public bonds when ex post renegotiation is not possible because of the large number of
dispersed investors.
The commitment value of public bonds relative to bank loans has been documented ex-
tensively in the corporate and emerging markets literature: Brunner and Krahnen (2008) and
Bolton and Jeanne (2007) respectively show that debt restructuring becomes more difficult the
more lenders are involved. The results documented by Roberts and Sufi (2009) that a large
fraction of all loan contracts are renegotiated prior to maturity can therefore not easily be
transferred to public bonds. We present a different method of solving this issue: giving the
issuer the option ex ante to optimally remove covenants ex post. We demonstrate that firms
with defeasance options are willing to accept more covenants and document it on our data.
Our model also contributes to the literature on hold-up problems in financial contracts.
Our paper is mostly closely related to No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1995) that shows how option
contracts can overcome hold-up problems induced by contractual incompleteness. We show
how option contracts can be used to ensure that control is de-facto state contingent even if
there is no interim signal available to verify the state. We also show how the use of defeasance
options can alleviate the hold-up problem associated with public bond covenants.
Commercial mortgage backed securities are similar to public bonds since they typically
include restrictive covenants (to limit the borrowers’ ability to refinance) and also grant the
borrower a defeasance option. In line with our predictions, Dierker, Quan, and Tourous (2005)
reports evidence on a sample of defeasance exercise in commercial mortgage backed securities
that the value of the option to defease critically depends on the rate of return that can be earned
on the released equity, the prevailing interest rate conditions and the contractual features of
the option.
2 A Model of Multiple Control Rights.
We present a simple model to study the assignment and exercise of multiple control rights
when there is no verifiable intermediate signal in the sense of Aghion and Bolton (1992). Our
model originates in Tirole (2006) which in turn is based on Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997) and is
an extension of Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Aghion and Tirole (1997). We will then apply
this model to study action-limiting covenants in bond contracts (restrictions on asset sales,
mergers, or dividend payments).
2.1 Players and Technology.
There is a firm that has an investment project. This project requires an investment outlay, I
and generates a return Y which is either 0 in case of failure, or R, R >> 0. The firm does not
have the funds needed to fund the investment. It can only invest A < I and needs a financier
for the remainder, I −A.
Once the investment is sunk, the manager has to decide on how much effort to exert. The
effort choice is a binary variable, e ∈ {0, 1}. Exerting no effort (e = 0) gives the manager
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some private benefit, Q but yields zero return with higher probability. After effort has been
exerted, but before the final returns are realized, a signal s ∈ {L,H} is observed. This signal
is a sufficient statistics for the effort exerted and also indicative of the project’s success.
There are 1 to K decisions that can be implemented after the signal is observed. The
financial contract assigns control over each decision to one of the two parties. If the financier
is assigned decision k, then implementing this decision k results in an increase in the final
probability of success τk, and of the repayment of debt. However, it costs the firm a “private”
disutility γk in private benefits of control or unexploited or expired growth opportunities. In
the context of bond contracts decisions 1 through k can be interpreted as covenants on asset
sales, dividend payments, acquisitions, mergers, new debt issues, etc. If, for example, the bond
contract contains a covenant forbidding asset sales, and/or dividend payments, then in the
model control over decisions involving asset sales and/or dividend payments is assigned to the
bondholders. If renegotiation is infeasible, which is the typical case in dispersedly held public
bonds, then a decision assigned to public bondholders is implemented with probability 1, i.e.
it commits the firm to give up the option to sell assets or pay dividends until the bond is
paid off. The firm benefits from giving up dividend payments, new debt issues, etc. during
the life of the bond because this commitment increases the likelihood of the repayment of the
bond for the lender and thereby increases the ex ante pledgeable income of the firm. The cost
for the firm is a combination of private benefits of control and unexploited or expired growth
opportunities.
Following Tirole (2006) we assume that the cost and benefit is independent of the signal
realization and rank the decisions by their benefit-to-cost ratio, τkRγk with the convention that
decision 1 has the highest such ratio. Implementing a particular decision, k by the financier is
efficient if and only if τkRγk ≥ 1. We denote by k
∗ the last (first best) efficient decision (the last
decision for which τkRγk ≥ 1 while
τk+1R
γk+1
< 1). We denote by dk the probability of implementing
decision k. If renegotiation is infeasible, then a decision assigned to public bondholders is
implemented with probability 1.
The ex ante chances of success are formally dependent on effort, interim states and decisions
as follows:
Prob(s|e = eH) = σHs
Prob(s|e = eL) = σLs
Prob(Y = R|s) = νs +
K∑
k=1
dkτk
Effort is neither observable nor verifiable. Final returns are verifiable. The interim state
of the world s = {L,H} is not verifiable, although it is observable by both parties.
We assume that without effort, the project has a negative NPV. In addition, we focus
on projects for which pledgeable income is insufficient to raise the necessary financing and
therefore allocations of control rights are critical. We restrict our attention to projects that
satisfy
A1: A < I −
(
σHHνH + (1− σHH) νL +
∑k∗
k=1 τkdk
)(
R− Q∆σ∆ν
)
.
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As shown later, assumption A1 implies that the ex-ante expected pledgeable income of the
project is not sufficient to compensate investors if they are limited to control only efficient
decisions.
2.2 Control Allocation without Defeasance.
Suppose that the financial contract can only specify a final repayment from the firm to the
financier and each decision k to be implemented with probability dk (independent of the interim
signal). For the moment we rule out the possibility of interim renegotiation. Under the choice
of high effort the firm’s payoff is:
max
Rb,dk
σHH
((
νH +
K∑
k=1
τkdk
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkdk
)
+
(1− σHH)
((
νL +
K∑
k=1
τkdk
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkdk
)
and the incentive constraint requires that:
σHH
((
νH +
K∑
k=1
τkdk
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkdk
)
+
(1− σHH)
((
νL +
K∑
k=1
τkdk
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkdk
)
≥
σLH
((
νH +
K∑
k=1
τkdk
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkdk
)
+
(1− σLH)
((
νL +
K∑
k=1
τkdk
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkdk
)
+Q
which simplifies to
(R−Rb) ≥ Q∆σ∆ν . (IC)
The financier accepts the contract if and only if:
σHH
(
νH +
K∑
k=1
τkdk
)
Rb + (1− σHH)
(
νL +
K∑
k=1
τkdk
)
Rb ≥ I −A (IR)
The optimal contractual arrangement maximizes the firm’s payoff subject to (IC) and
(IR). Forming the Lagrange function (where α, and λ, are the multipliers of the (IC), and
(IR) constraints, respectively). Taking its partial derivatives yields
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∂L
∂Rb
= (λ− 1)
(
σHHνH + (1− σHH)νL +
K∑
k=1
τkdk
)
− α
∂L
∂dk
= τkR− γk + (λ− 1)τkRb
It cannot be that α = 0, otherwise λ = 1, Rb = R − Q∆σ∆ν and only the first-best efficient
decisions are implemented with probability 1. But if this is the case, the financier can at best
get: (
σHHνH + (1− σHH) νL +
k∗∑
k=1
τkdk
)(
R− Q
∆σ∆ν
)
< I −A
as implied by A1.
If α > 0, then λ > 1 and a decision is implemented if and only if:
τkR
γk
≥ 1− (λ− 1)τkRb
γk
.
This indicates that the optimal contractual arrangement involves some inefficient control
allocations. To increase pledgeable income the firm needs to give up control of some decisions
that would be efficient to keep within the firm, i.e. decisions for which 1 > τkRγk ≥ 1 − (λ −
1) τkRbγk ).
A particular mechanism to implement this outcome is to give the financier control over
decisions k = 1, ...k˜ (with k˜ being the last decision so that τ k˜Rγ
k˜
≥ 1 − (λ − 1) τ k˜Rbγ
k˜
) while
the firm keeps control of all other decisions. Until now the argument follows Tirole’s (2006)
analysis and we record this as a result:
Result 1: If the interim state of the world is non-verifiable, and in the absence of renegotiation,
allocating control over decisions 1 to k˜ to the financier, and the firm controlling the other
decisions is optimal. Moreover, k˜ ≥ k∗. This inequality is strict when the differences between
τkR
γk
and τk+1Rγk+1 are small enough.
Thus, the financier is granted more control rights than the first-best solution suggests if
the interim state of the world is non-verifiable. In this case the only way to increase pledgable
income is to impose an additional cost on the firm/manager. This of course results in an
inefficiency since the manager and/or the firm loses some private benefits and/or future growth
opportunities.
Note that in the context of bond covenants with no possibility of renegotiation, dk = 1 if
a particular decision k is under the financier’s control. This is equivalent to saying that if the
financier is allocated control over certain decisions such as asset sales, new debt issues, and/or
dividend payments, then these actions are forbidden or restricted by the covenants placed in
the bond. For example, if a covenant stipulates that the firm cannot issue new debt until
the bond is paid off and there is no possibility of renegotiation, then the firm cannot make a
decision to issue new debt until the bond is paid off.
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For the rest of the analysis we assume that there are sufficiently many control rights that
can be allocated between the issuer and the financier so the differences between τkRγk and
τk+1R
γk+1
are small enough for k˜ ≥ k∗ to hold for strict inequality.
2.3 Control Allocation with Defeasance.
Efficiency may be increased if the allocation of control rights could differ across states. We
consider this case next. Denote by dωk the probability that the financier controls decision k in
state ω = H,L. Then, the optimization problem becomes:
maxRb,dHk ,dLk σHH
((
νH +
K∑
k=1
τkd
H
k
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkd
H
k
)
+
(1− σHH)
((
νL +
K∑
k=1
τkd
L
k
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkd
L
k
)
and the incentive constraint requires that
σHH
((
νH +
K∑
k=1
τkd
H
k
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkd
H
k
)
+
(1− σHH)
((
νL +
K∑
k=1
τkd
L
k
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkd
L
k
)
≥
σLH
((
νH +
K∑
k=1
τkd
H
k
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkd
H
k
)
+
(1− σLH)
((
νL +
K∑
k=1
τkd
L
k
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γkd
L
k
)
+Q
which simplifies to
∆σ
(
∆ν (R−Rb) +
K∑
k=1
τk
(
dHk − dLk
)
(R−Rb)−
K∑
k=1
γk
(
dHk − dLk
)) ≥ Q.
The financier’s IR constraint can be similarly amended. It is straightforward to check that
the partial derivatives of the Lagrange function now become:
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∂L
∂Rb
= (α− 1)
(
σHH
(
νH +
K∑
k=1
τkd
H
k
)
+ (1− σHH)
(
νL +
K∑
k=1
τkd
L
k
))
−
λ
(
∆σ∆ν + ∆σ
K∑
k=1
τk(dHk − dLk )
)
∂L
∂dHk
= τkR− γk + (α− 1)τkRb + λ
∆σ
σHH
(τk (R−Rb)− γk)
∂L
∂dLk
= τkR− γk + (α− 1)τkRb − λ
∆σ
1− σHH (τk (R−Rb)− γk)
Our first lemma establishes the optimal allocation of state-contingent control rights in the
good state of nature.
Lemma 1: For the optimal allocation of state-contingent control rights in state H, it must
be the case that d∗k ≥ dH
∗
k . Or, equivalently, k˜ > k
∗ ≥ k∗H . The inequality will be strict if
differences between τk∗Rγk∗ and
τk∗−1R
γk∗−1
are small enough.
Proof: See Appendix.
This lemma states that if control rights could be made contingent on states, the financier
would not receive all efficient control rights. The reason for this apparent inefficiency is that
the firm does not reap all financial benefits from implementing decisions k∗H − k∗ but has to
bear all the costs. Thus, seen from the firm’s point of view it is only efficient to give away k∗H
decisions.1 The inequalities in Lemma 1 will be strict if differences between τk∗Rγk∗ and
τk∗−1R
γk∗−1
are small enough. For the rest of the analysis we assume that this is the case.
Our second lemma establishes the optimal allocation of state-contingent control rights in
state L.
Lemma 2: For the optimal allocation of state-contingent control rights in state L, it must
be the case that for all k = 1...k∗L, d
L∗
k = 1. Moreover, k
∗
L ≥ k∗. This inequality is strict if
differences between τk∗Rγk∗ and
τk∗+1R
γk∗+1
are small enough.
Proof: See Appendix
Notice that the two lemmas imply that k∗L > k
∗
H when differences between
τk∗R
γk∗
, τk∗−1Rγk∗−1 and
τk∗+1R
γk∗+1
are small enough. Hence, the optimal contract implies that the firm has to give away
more control rights in the bad than in the good state of nature or under the first-best. Thus,
in the good state of nature, the optimal contract would assign the financier fewer control rights
than the first best would dictate, and in the bad state more. In other words, if it were possible
1Note that this also means that there is no point in trying to renegotiate this, as the financier will not be
able to compensate the firm for its loss of private benefits.
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to make control rights state contingent, the financier would hold more control in the bad state
of nature. In context of public bond contracts, our model implies that if it were possible to
make action-limiting covenants state-contingent, then it would be optimal to include more
action-limiting covenants in the bad state and fewer in the good state.
We refer to {k∗H , k∗L} as the constrained-efficient decision rule. It is the decision rule that
would be efficient to implement, contingent on the realization of ω, when at the same time the
final repayment Rb can only depend on the realization of the final returns Y. Proposition 1
describes a mechanism to implement the desired allocation of control.
Proposition 1: If the interim state is non verifiable, the following mechanism can implement
the constrained-efficient decision rule:
• give control to the financier over k∗L decisions;
• give an option to the firm to buy back control over decisions k∗H to k∗L. The cost of
exercising this option must be chosen so that the firm can only exercise this option if
σ = H;
• if k∗H = 0, the firm must have the option to buy back control over all decisions.
The implication of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 is k∗H < k
∗
L. Notice that a sufficient condition for
k∗H = 0 is that 0 ≥ τkR− γk for all k, i.e. it is efficient to leave control with the issuer in state
H, that is, to remove all covenants in state H.
What is the optimal exercise price of the option to buy back control? Suppose first that
the firm has no cash, so that the exercise price is paid by an increase in the financier’s share
of returns (i.e. an increase in Rb). We call rb this increase.
The first observation is that the value of buying back control over any decision must be
independent of the state. Indeed, the firm’s value of removing any decision, k is equal to
τk(R−Rb)− γk regardless whether the state is H or L. What is affected by the interim state
of nature is the firm’s ability to exercise the option. Secondly, the financier’s loss of giving up
control of any decision k, τkRb, is also independent of the state nature. The third observation
is that if the firm needs to pay some amount P to exercise the option and has no cash of its
own, then it can raise up to (νH +
∑K
k=1 τkd
H
k )rb in state H when buying back control over
decisions k∗L to k
∗
H . If the firm were to exercise the option in state L, it would be able to raise
(νL +
∑K
k=1 τkd
H
k )rb, a lesser amount. Notice that because this option can only be exercised
at date 1, after the effort choice has been irrevocably made, the firm can tap into a “fresh”
new debt capacity. Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal exercise price of the option.
Proposition 2: An option to take control of all decisions k∗H to k
∗
L at price P such that
(νH +
K∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb) ≥ P ≥ (νL +
K∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb) (1)
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and
P ≥
k∗L∑
k=k∗H
τkRb (2)
implements the constrained-efficient decision rule2 if (νH+
∑K
k=1 τkd
H
k )(R−Rb) ≥
∑k∗L
k=k∗H
τkRb.
Note that if
∑k∗L
k=k∗H
τkRb > (νH +
∑K
k=1 τkd
H
k )(R − Rb), then there does not exist any
exercise price at which the financier would give up control over decisions k∗H through k
∗
L.
Importantly, the option must be restricted to buy back control rights over all decisions
k∗H to k
∗
L. No “unbundling” of this option should be allowed ex ante. If the firm were allowed
to remove individual covenants at lower prices, it would be able to do so even in state L when
it can only raise lesser funds. Hence, Proposition 2 must hold for individual covenants.
Corollary 1: It is in the lender’s best interest to price the removal of any individual covenant
so that the borrower can only afford it in state H. That is, if
(νH +
K∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb) ≥
k∗L∑
k=k∗H
τkRb,
then, ∀k ∈ {k∗L, k∗H}
(νH +
K∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb) ≥ Pkˆ ≥ (νL +
K∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb) (3)
and
Pkˆ ≥
k∗L∑
k=k∗H
τkRb (4)
where Pkˆ denote the exercise price of the option to remove covenant kˆ.
Whether giving more control rights to the financier together with the option for the firm
to remove them is a better arrangement than granting him fewer control rights ex ante with
no such option attached depends on the option’s exercise price. To see how, we compare the
firm’s payoff after the realization of each interim state under both mechanisms. As far as the
provision of incentives is concerned, it is best that the firm is punished as harshly as possible
2Under the standard assumption that indifference are broken in favor of efficiency. If not, the inequalities
should be strict.
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in state L and is rewarded as generously as possible in state H. The exercise price of the
option has no impact on the firm when the option is not exercised, that is in state L. Hence,
determining the optimal exercise price, the only consideration is what happens in the H state.
Corollary 2: If (νL +
∑K
k=1 τkd
H
k )(R−Rb) ≥
∑k∗L
k=k∗H
τkRb, then the best option mechanism
must have as exercise price P ∗ = (νL +
∑K
k=1 τkd
H
k )(R−Rb), the minimum price under which
the issuer only exercises the option in state H. If the reverse is true, then a higher exercise
price is set, P ∗ =
∑k∗L
k=k∗H
τkRb, to cover the financier’s higher costs. Hence,
P ∗ = max{(νL +
k∗L∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb);
k∗L∑
k=k∗H
τkRb}
Finally, if
∑k∗L
k=k∗H
τkRb ≥ (νH +
∑K
k=1 τkd
H
k )(R−Rb), the issuer will not be able to afford the
option exercise.
Charging the lowest possible exercise price given the incentive compatibility and individual
rationality conditions is the best way to reward the firm in state H. The price cannot be less
than P ∗, otherwise the option will be exercised all the time. But the need to maximize the
firm’s reward implies that it should not be more either. So this price works as a cap on the
firm’s payments, and the firm cannot afford to pay it in state L.
How does a debt contract with covenants and an option to buy back control compare with
another that grants irrevocable control rights to the financier? We answer this question in
two steps. First we show that when covenants are bundled with an option to remove them,
the issuing firm is willing to grant more control to the financier. Second we establish that the
yield on covenant bonds which include this option is lower than the yield on bonds which grant
irrevocable control rights to the financier.
Proposition 3: When the firm is given the option to buy back control over decisions k∗H to
k∗L, then the firm will grant the financier control over at least as many decisions ex ante as in
the absence of this option: k∗L ≥ k˜. This inequality is strict if differences between
τk∗
L
R
γk∗
L
and
τk∗
L
−1R
γk∗
L
−1
are small enough.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 implies that in state L, the firm is more harshly punished with the option
mechanism. The option is not exercised in state L and the financier has more control in this
state and implements more decisions. The main empirical implication of Proposition 3 is a
positive association between the number of rights given to the financier and the inclusion of
an option to buy back control, that is, k∗L > k˜.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 establish the price at which the firm can only afford to
exercise the option to remove covenants in the H state. Given the exercise price, the firm may
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or may not exercise the option in the H state, however. Whether the firm exercises the option
ex post depends on the gains from controlling decisions k∗H and k
∗
L and the cost of the exercise.
Proposition 4 identifies conditions under which the option to take control will be exercised by
the issuer in state H.
Proposition 4: The option to take back control of decisions k∗H through k
∗
L will be exercised
by the issuer in state H, if
k˜∑
k∗H
γkd
H
k ≥ max{(νL +
k∗L∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb);
k∗L∑
k=k∗H
τkRb} (5)
Proof: See Appendix.
The option to buy back control will be exercised by the issuer ex post if the exercise is
affordable, i.e. if the growth opportunity, γk, from controlling decisions k∗H through k
∗
L is large
enough, and/or the probability of success in state L, (νL+
∑k∗L
k=1 τkd
H
k ), is relatively small and
so is the financier’s benefit of controlling these decisions in the high state. The issuer will not
exercise the option if the gain from controlling decisions k∗H to k
∗
L is relatively small, and/or
the probability of success in state L is large, i.e. when the benefits of being in state H are less
pronounced.
The next step is to compare the yields for the optimal bonds with state-contingent and
irrevocable covenants. Assume, as before, that the interim state is non-verifiable. Let B∗∗
denote the optimal one among bonds with state-contingent covenants and let B∗ stand for the
optimal bond among those with non-contingent covenants. Then,
Proposition 5: The bond with the option to remove covenants, B∗∗, demands a lower yield
than B∗, the bond with irrevocable covenants if
k˜∑
k∗H
γkd
H
k ≥ max{(νL +
k˜∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb);
k∗L∑
k=k∗H
τkRb)} (6)
and
(νH +
k∗L∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb) ≥
k∗L∑
k=k∗H
τkRb (7)
hold.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 5 establishes that investors are willing to pay a premium for bonds that include
the option to buy back control. The intuition for the premium is twofold. First, the optimal
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bond with the option to remove covenants, B∗∗ includes more covenants than the optimal bond
with irrevocable control rights, B∗, i.e. k∗L ≥ k˜ as shown by Proposition 3. Secondly, when
the issuer exercises the option to take control in the good state and pays the exercise price,
max{(νL +
∑k˜
k=1 τkd
H
k )(R − Rb);
∑k∗L
k=k∗H
τkRb)}, it is as if the bond is (partially) prepaid in
the good state, so that the expected risk borne by the financier is reduced ex ante. The option
will not be exercised in state H unless both (6) and (7) hold.
Next we compute the difference in yields between bonds with irrevocable and defeasible
covenants by decomposing it into economically meaningful parts. Let h = Rb∗ − Rb∗∗ denote
the yield difference between a bond with irrevocable and defeasible covenants. Define ν =
σHHνH + (1 − σHH)νL and assume in line with our previous discussion on bond covenants
that dk = 1. As in Corollary 2 P* stand for the exercise price of the option for removing
covenants.
Proposition 6: The yield difference can be decomposed as
h =
σHHP
∗ − σHH
∑k˜
k=k∗H
τkRb∗∗ + (1− σHH)
∑k∗L
k=k˜
τkRb∗∗
ν +
∑k˜
k=1 τk
(8)
where the first term in the numerator is the product of the option’s exercise price that the
lender receives in the good state and the probability of the exercise; the second term is the
product, with a negative sign, of the value for the lender of keeping covenants k∗H through k˜
in the good state and the probability of the state; and the third term is the product of the
financier’s expected gain from holding additional control rights in state L and the probability
of that state. The payments are scaled by the probability of repayment (the denominator).
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 6 demonstrates that the premium that investors are willing to pay for a defea-
sible bond depends on three factors. As the decomposition shows, it depends positively on the
expected exercise price, negatively on the financier’s expected loss from giving up covenants in
state H, and positively on the financier’s expected gain from holding additional control rights
in state L. (As per Proposition 5, the sum of the first and third component more than offsets
the second component.)
Thus, the lender is willing to pay a premium for a defeasible bond because in state H the
issuer will exercise the defeasance option and will partially pre-pay the bond making it less
risky for the lender, and in state L the issuer will comply with more covenants than otherwise.
One question of course remains. If defeasable bonds enjoy premia, would the issuer prefer
to include defeasance options in all bonds? Proposition 7 shows that this is not the case.
Proposition 7: If either (6) or (7) fails, then the firm prefers to issue a bond with irrevocable
covenants.
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Proof: See Appendix.
Note that if condition (7) fails, then there is no exercise price that the financier can accept
and the issuer can afford. If condition (6) fails, then there is an exercise price that the financier
would accept and the issuer could afford in state H. However, the issuer will never exercise at
this price because the value of the private benefits or growth opportunities from controlling
these decisions is not worth the exercise price.
Proposition 7 demonstrates that not all bonds will include an option to buy back covenants.
If
∑k˜
k∗H
γkd
H
k < max{(νL+
∑k˜
k=1 τkd
H
k )(R−Rb);
∑k∗L
k=k∗H
τkRb}, then the option to take control
will never be exercised, and issuing B∗∗ would be inefficient because B∗∗ gives away more than
the optimal number of decisions. The financier would pay a small premium for this bond
(conditional on the incentive compatibility conditions being met) because the financier values
control over more decisions in state L. But this premium is not sufficient to compensate the
issuer for the disutility of giving up control of these decisions in all states. Hence, firms prefer
to issue bonds with irrevocable covenants, B∗, if
∑k˜
k∗H
γkd
H
k < max{(νL +
∑k˜
k=1 τkd
H
k )(R −
Rb);
∑k∗L
k=k∗H
τkRb} holds.
Thus, our model predicts that firms with substantial growth options, low pledgeable income
and high degree of uncertainty prefer to issue bonds with defeasable covenants.
In summary the predictions of our theoretical model are as follows:
i) If the firm’s pledgeable income is limited and in the absence of verifiable signals about the
state of nature, the issuer of a bond assigns more control rights to the financier than implied
by the first best.
ii) In case a state-contingent, verifiable signal is available, the firm gives away fewer rights
in the high state and more rights in the low state than in i) above.
iii) In the absence of a state-contingent, verifiable signal an option given to the firm to buy
back control over all decisions k∗H to k
∗
L at a predetermined price P implements the outcome
in ii).
iv) There exist conditions under which firms issue bonds with the option to buy back control
and conditions under which firms issue bonds with irrevocable covenants. In particular, firms
with more substantial growth options, less pledgeable income and higher degree of uncertainty
prefer to issue bonds with defeasable covenants, whereas firms with lesser growth opportunities,
more pledgeable income and less uncertainty prefer to issue bonds with irrevocable covenants.
v) Bonds that grant the issuer the right to take back control will be issued at a premium
relative to other bonds. The premium is partly due to the increased number of decisions
controlled by the financier in the low state and partly due to the expected risk reduction by
the option exercise in the high state.
In the next part of the paper we test the predictions of the model on a sample of US
corporate bonds.
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3 Empirical Analysis
In this section we present empirical evidence on covenant defeasance options that are widely
used in US corporate bonds. These options are remarkably similar to those predicted in our
theoretical model.
In the next subsections we introduce our sample, define covenant defeasance from actual
bond contracts, describe how it works in practice, and then test the predictions of our theory.
3.1 The Data Set
We build our data set of about 10,584 corporate bond issues from the Mergent Fixed Investment
Securities Database (FISD, described in Mergent (2004)) following Billet, King, and Mauer
(2007), Reisel (2004), and Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2007).3 We use all bond issues from
01/01/1980 to 31/12/2008. We only consider regular US corporate bonds, that is we exclude
foreign currency denominated bonds or bonds from international issuers in the US. We exclude
all government and municipal bonds and any asset-backed bonds, private placements and
convertible bonds. To ensure that we have covenant information available, we do not include
medium term notes (MTN) as FISD does not collect covenant information for these types of
bonds. Finally, we exclude bonds for which the subsequent information flag in FISD is not
set.4 This leaves 10,584 corporate issues. In a second step we merge this data with balance
sheet information taken from Compustat by CUSIP and use the last balance sheet prior to the
bond’s issuance. The resulting sample has 4,856 observations. We use rating information from
FISD to compute the average rating for each traded bond. As most bonds have several ratings
available we use the rating closest to the bond issue for each rating agency included in FISD.
3.2 What is defeasance?
Defeasance comes in several flavors. There are two types of defeasance options in corpo-
rate bonds. One is an option to remove the bond from the issuer’s balance sheet, while the
other, more importantly, is to remove the covenants from the bond. The first is called “eco-
nomic”defeasance, the second is called “legal”or “covenant”defeasance (Johnson, Pari, and
Rosenthal (1989) and Hand, Huhges, and Sefcik (1990)).
An exact definition of legal or covenant defeasance is provided by FISD (Mergent (2004)):
“[Covenant Defeasance] gives the issuer the right to defease indenture covenants without tax
consequences for bondholders. If exercised, this would free the issuer from covenants set forth
in the indenture or prospectus, but leaves them liable for the remaining debt. The issuer
must also set forth an opinion of counsel that states bondholders will not recognize income for
federal tax purposes as a result of the defeasance. [..] defeasance occurs when the issuer places
in an escrow account an amount of money or U.S. government securities sufficient to match
3See table 10 for more details.
4According to FISD this includes bonds that were announced but not subsequently issued for example.
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the remaining interest and principle payments of the current issue.”We also verified that this
definition of legal or covenant defeasance is the one used in real indenture agreements. For one
such example please see Coca-Cola (2005).
Hence legal defeasance is defined as the right of the issuer to remove the covenants from the
bond in exchange of a pre-specified payment. This is one of the few rights not allocated to the
bondholder. Mergent (2004) classifies a bond to contain covenant defeasance if the borrower
has the option to remove the covenants. In practice, the defeasance option specifies that all
covenants be removed at the same time and the defeasance is irrevocable, making the bond
riskless. We focus on “legal defesance” in our empirical analysis since this option is the one
that is more or less equivalent to the defeasance option derived in our model. It is a special
case of the defeasance option derived in our model because in our model all covenants do not
have to be removed at the same time. Of course, in our model we only have two states, whereas
in practice there are many relevant states of nature for the lender and the borrower. If we
define the state in which the removal of all covenants is desirable as state H (which is a special
case of the general setup), then the defeasance option in our model will perfectly match the
one observed in US corporate bond issues.
Is such an explicit defeasance option necessary? Generally, the answer is yes. “In-substance”
defeasance is a potential alternative when the bond issuer does not have a defeasance option.
In this case the issuer places securities with a trustee in order to mimic economic defeasance.
This type of defeasance however does not free the firm from any covenants but may improve
balance sheet ratios (Hand, Huhges, and Sefcik (1990)). The reason for this difference lies in
the U.S. Trust Indenture Act that forbids the waiver of covenants without explicit approval
from at least two thirds of all bondholders (Smith and Warner (1978)).
We make three key observations from the study of defeasance clauses in US corporate
bonds. First, defeasance options in US corporate bonds are very similar to the option to
remove covenants predicted in our optimal contracting model. Second, defeasance options in
practice specify the removal of all covenants at the same time, similar to our proposition that
all state-relevant covenants should be removed together. Third, in line with our model, the
defeasance option sets the exercise price ex ante, and sets it high enough so that the exercise
can only be afforded in the high state. In practice the issuer deposits cash and marketable
securities in an escrow account sufficient to pay the principal off and interest on the bond on
the scheduled due dates, thereby making the issue risk-free upon exercise.
In a next step we report summary statistics for our sample. Then we present several
hypotheses based on the propositions in our theoretical model. We will show that the inclusion
of a defeasance option is positively related to the number of covenants in a bond. We also
show that the inclusion of a defeasance clause leads to a decrease in the yield to maturity
between 13 to 25 basis points. We will present supporting evidence that underwriters do not
include defeasance options in a boiler-plate fashion, but seem to add them deliberately and
that callability is not a direct substitute for defeasance.
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3.3 Summary Statistics
Panel 1 of table 1 shows the distribution of US corporate bonds by issuer. In our sample
the majority of issuers has only one bond outstanding but some firms have more than 10
outstanding. In the remainder of table 1 we present summary statistics for our sample of
10,584 bond issues between 1980 and 2008.5 We divide the full sample into two subsamples of
bonds with and without defeasance. The first thing we notice is that covenant defeasance is an
important clause, we document it in roughly about 68% of all corporate bonds in our sample.
Nevertheless, as predicted in our model, many corporate bonds do not include a covenant
defeasance option.
The summary statistics show that bonds with and without covenant defeasance option
are substantially different from each other. Bonds with defeasance options have higher yields,
lower ratings, higher treasury spreads, and shorter maturities than bonds without a defeasance
clause. The difference in yields is about 25 basis points, roughly consistent with 40 basis points
difference in the treasury spread. The difference in ratings is roughly three rating categories, the
difference in levels is between BBB+ (Baa1) to BBB- (Baa3), measured on a scale that converts
ratings into numerical values (AAA=1, C=21). Both subsamples of bonds have covenants
attached, however, bonds that include defeasance options seem to include substantially more
covenants per bond. This is so by the total number of covenants or by specific subclasses of
covenants on asset sale or additional debt, and is consistent with Proposition 3. The majority
of bonds in our sample are callable. There seems to be no difference with respect to callability
between defeasable and non-defeasible bonds.
3.4 Action-limiting covenants and the covenant defeasance option
In this section we compare covenants in defeasible and non-defeasible bonds. Table 2 shows
the use of all covenants in our FISD sample for bonds with and without defeasance. Table 3
presents the definitions for each covenant.
The first part of table 2 shows the unconditional means for all covenants included in the
issues in our FISD sample of US corporate bonds. As reported in the table, some covenants
are frequent (ir1 Consolidation Merger is present in 90% of the issues), others are rare (bh12
Declining Net Worth has virtually no presence).
As expected, almost all bond covenants are state-independent, negative or action-limiting
covenants. In stark contrast to the bank loans in Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009), in corporate
bonds covenants are rarely tied to balance sheet items, in other words, there are very few
positive or state-contingent covenants in bonds. For example, in the data of Nini, Smith, and
Sufi (2009) 25% of all loans contain Net Worth Covenants, whereas bonds do not contain such
clauses. Instead, in corporate bonds we find state-independent restrictions on additional debt
5We concentrate on the larger sample of firms that have issued public debt and not only those that are also
publicly listed.
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issues, asset sales, payout policy and mergers. As our theory predicts, the defeasance option
is used in conjunction with state-independent (or unconditional) covenants.
Panels 2 and 3 of table 2 show that bonds with a covenant defeasance option include
significantly more covenants than bonds without, although the opposite can (occasionally)
also occur. The increase varies across covenants, and is particularly large for some: the asset
sale clause (bh18) is included in 6% of non-defeasible bonds but 40% of defeasible bonds, and
restrictions on new debt issues (ir4) are included in 15% of non-defeasible bonds but in 49%
of defeasible bonds. The increases are lower for the few balance sheet related state-contingent
covenants than for either the asset sale restrictions or the cash restrictions, implying that
the covenant defeasance option allows the firm to include more non-contingent covenants, as
predicted by the model.
In table 4 we regress the number of covenants on defeasance. To do so we now consider
the reduced sample of firms that are publicly listed by merging issue information with balance
sheet data from Compustat. First we look at two measures, the number of restrictions on debt
issuance and the number of restrictions on asset sales, then at the total number of covenants.
Following Billet, King, and Mauer (2007), Reisel (2004), and Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2003)
we employ a number of standard control variables to proxy for firm and bond characteristics,
including the issue’s maturity, EBIT, Cash, the firm’s market capitalization, the return on
assets, the volatility of the return on assets, fixed assets, seniority, investments and leverage.6
For each dependent variable we first run a Poisson regression where we report average
partial effects and second a standard pooled OLS regression that controls for year, industry
and ratings. Our estimation strategy is necessitated by the very particular structure our sample
has. It is neither a full panel as we do not observe every firm multiple times, nor a pure cross-
section as we observe some firms multiple times. Following Petersen (2008) we use standard
errors clustered at the firm level. In the case of the Poisson regressions robust standard errors
also take care of any existing overdispersion (Cameron and Trivedi (2009)), however as we have
multiple observations by some firms we do not use simple robust standard errors but instead
cluster standard errors around firms.
We find that the presence of a defeasance option is associated with an increase in the
number of covenants in a statistically significant way. Regardless of the inclusion of year and
industry fixed effects, the number of covenants still increases when defeasance is included in
the contract. This result is consistent with Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, that is, the inclusion
of a covenant defeasance option makes the issuer willing to include more covenants in the bond.
Economic effects are also significant. In the Poisson case, the economic effects can be
interpreted as a semi-elasticity and in our case of a Poisson model with a constant included,
the average partial effect becomes APE = β̂jy, the average of the dependent variable times the
estimated coefficient for the independent variable of interest (Cameron and Trivedi (2009)).
6Since these variables are not central to our results we refer the reader to the above papers for an interpre-
tation of their economic effects.
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We find that the increase is between 15% (for debt issuance restrictions) and 91% (for the total
number of covenants) and hence is highly economically significant.
3.5 Which bonds include a covenant defeasance clause?
In table 5 we document the use of defeasance clauses by firm type. Recall from Proposition
7 that if both conditions (6) and (7) are satisfied, then the firm is better off by including a
covenant defeasance option in its bond, and if either of these conditions fail, the firm is better
off by issuing a bond with irrevocable covenants. If condition (7) is violated, then the firm
cannot afford the cost of exercising the option. On the other hand, if condition (6) is violated,
then the expected value of the growth opportunities that the issuer can exploit by removing
covenants and taking control of certain decisions is less than the option’s exercise price. If
both conditions (6) and (7) are satisfied, then not only can the firm afford the exercise of the
covenant defeasance option in state H, but by taking control, the firm gains more than the
exercise price.
We can see from Proposition 7 that whether conditions (6) and (7) hold or fail, depends
upon i) the firms’ pledgeable income, ii) the number of covenants, iii) the size of the issue, iv)
the value of taking control and exploiting the firm’s growth opportunities, and v) the degree of
cash flow variability or the degree of uncertainty. Hence, in our empirical specification for the
inclusion of the covenant defeasance clause we want to use measures that capture firms’ future
profitability/growth opportunities, uncertainty, pledgeable income, etc. as well as covenants
most relevant for growth opportunities, such as asset sale and debt issuance restrictions. Future
profitability of course depends on the return on assets and the firm’s growth options. In line
with our model’s predictions and following Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2003)7, we include the
market-to-book ratio in our regressions. Plausible measures of uncertainty are ROA Volatility
and standard deviation of equity returns, while pledgeable income can be proxied by the fixed
asset ratio.
The degree of uncertainty can be also proxied by maturity since it is likely to increase with
maturity. The longer the maturity, the more likely that covenants may restrict flexibility to
such extent that it may be desirable for the firm to keep the option to remove them later. Issue
size can also be viewed as a proxy for the growth opportunities of the firm, and for the degree
of dispersion of bondholders and the resulting difficulty of renegotiation. We also add firm
characteristics from table 4, where we look at factors influencing the number of covenants, as
explanatory variables.
First we run a Logit regression in which we control for the number debt-issuance restric-
tions, asset-sale restrictions, and the total number of covenants present (excluding those that
bind subsidiaries) respectively and report average partial effects. We also include the bond’s
maturity, size, the firm’s EBIT, cash, cash flow, market capitalization, market to book ratio,
7Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2003) studies the use of action-limiting (negative) covenants in corporate bonds
and finds that firms with growth opportunities seem to be more likely to omit dividend or debt restrictions from
their issues.
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RoA, investment, leverage ratio and RoA volatility among our explanatory variables and con-
trol for both the term and credit spread. Model 1, 3, and 5 of 5 document our results. We
find that the number of debt-issuance restrictions, asset-sale restrictions and the total num-
ber of covenants are positively associated with the covenant defeasance clause and are both
statistically and economically significant. An additional asset sale restriction increases the
probability for the defeasance option by 14%. Fixed assets are significant and have a negative
sign, supporting our model’s prediction that the covenant defeasance clause is more likely to
be included by issuers with low pledgeable income. RoA Volatility is significant and positive in
most specifications without bond characteristics as explanatory variables indicating that firms
with higher degree of uncertainty are more likely to include a covenant defeasance clause in
their bond issue. Log(Market Cap) is negative and significant, suggesting that smaller firms
(which of course also includes firms in their high growth phase) are more likely to issue de-
feasible bonds. Market-to-Book does not show up as significant, which is surprising as Nash,
Netter, and Poulsen (2003) finds that exactly these types of firms are concerned with keep-
ing their operational flexibility. One possible explanation for this result may be that firms
with a large market-to-book ratio will rather not include covenants at all than incurring the
potentially large cost that defeasance may bring along.
Next we run OLS regressions with year, rating and industry fixed effects. Following Billet,
King, and Mauer (2007) and Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2007) we include bond characteristics
into our regressions together with firm characteristics used in the Logit specification. Model
2, 4, and 6 of 5 document our results. We find that issue size is positive and significant.
Since issue size can be viewed as a proxy for the growth opportunities of the firm (note that
we already control for firm size), and for the dispersion of bondholders and the resulting
difficulty of renegotiation that our Proposition 7 predicts both to be positively associated with
the issuers’ willingness to write a covenant defeasance clause in their bond, we interpret the
positive and significant coefficient in our regression in support for the prediction of our theory.
Maturity has an inverted U-shaped relationship. Hence, the covenant defeasance clause is
more frequently included, the longer is the maturity of the bond but this effect tapers off at
the longest maturities.
In unreported regressions we also run robustness checks where we include value-weighted
equity returns and standard deviation instead of the ROA and ROA volatility but our results
do not change. We also use alternative measures for growth options, sales growth and the ratio
of R&D expenditures to sales suggested by Billet, King, and Mauer (2007) but do not find
qualitatively different results.
3.6 Pricing
Proposition 5 of our theoretical model predicts that the inclusion of the covenant defeasance
option has an impact on bond yields. To see this, consider covenant defeasance as an American-
style call-option held by the borrower: any time during the life of the bond, it may be valuable
for the firm to remove the covenants in exchange of an escrow payment that makes the bond
risk-free to the bondholders. The value of such an option can be considered in the following
way:
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Evd = (Y TMBond − Y TMTreasury) · p, (9)
where Evd stands for the expected value of the defeasance option and p stands for the prob-
ability of defeasance. As this potential risk reduction in some states of the world will be
anticipated by both bondholders and bond issuer, one would expect to see a lower yield for
defeasable bonds, ceteribus paribus. Moreover, Proposition 5 suggests that there is another
source for a reduction in the bond’s yield: defeasable bonds also allow the inclusion of more
covenants in an issue without restricting the firm’s flexibility in the good state when the bond
is defeased.
Testing this prediction is important as it provides evidence whether defeasance actually
matters: whether investors take the inclusion of a covenant defeasance clause into account
when pricing an issue.8
In table 6 we run a simple t-test on the difference in yields between bonds that include a
defeasance option and those that do not. Consistent with our predictions we find a significant
reduction in yields up to BBB rated bonds. For BB and B rated bonds there are no significant
differences. Interestingly, for bonds that have defaulted in some way, that is C and D rated
bonds, we find the reverse, an increase in yields.
To see whether our results hold when we control for more factors, we turn to a multivariate
setting. Our methodology is simple, following Campbell and Taksler (2003) and others, we
run the a pooled OLS regression:
Y TM = β1·defeasance+β2·FirmControls+β3·IssueControls+δ1·OtherControls+i. (10)
We now use standard errors clustered around years and around issuers and report both. As
we are considering yields rather than covenants, it is possible that factors that vary over time,
such as credit spreads, rather than factors that vary across firms determine yields. However
we find that there are no significant differences between the type of clustering we employ 9
We control for the term structure of interest rates by including the spread between a one
year treasury bill and a treasury bond whose maturity matches the bond we consider. We also
include the spread between a AAA and a BAA rated bond as a control for the credit spread.
8Johnson, Pari, and Rosenthal (1989) find at least 49 instances of legal defeasance of US corporate bonds in
their sample of defeased bonds between 1980 and 1985. The FISD lists 9 bonds as defeased, 7 economic cases
of defeasance and 2 cases of legal defeasance. Given the relative high number of cases found by Johnson, Pari,
and Rosenthal (1989) we assume that FISD does not seem to be an accurate source of information about the
actual occurrence of defeasance. Johnson, Pari, and Rosenthal (1989) and Kahan and Rock (2009) also mention
the occurrence of covenant (legal) defeasance, but do not mention any numbers.
9We cannot run Fama MacBeth Regressions for two reasons. First, we do not have time invariant independent
variables (see Cochrane (2001) for a discussion). Second, even if that were the case we have firms in our sample
that issue several bonds within the same year. This implies that there may be correlation in the error terms
that we cannot pick up using a Fama MacBeth regression.
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Similarly we control for the number of covenants, the firm’s rating, the size of the bond issue
and the maturity of the bond in all regressions.
Table 7 presents our results. Model 1 shows large pricing effects: we find that the inclusion
of the covenant defeasance clause comes along with a reduction in the yield to maturity of 22
basis points. This means that investors are willing to accept a significant decrease in the yields
in exchange for the possibility to receive risk-free bond payments in the high state and for the
commitment to comply with more covenants in the low state.
We then run a series of robustness checks. In model 2 we include firm level controls. We
find that the presence of a covenant defeasance option is significant and is associated with a
17 basis point reduction in the yield to maturity. Model 3 includes dummies for each maturity
and dummies for each rating category. Again, the inclusion of the covenant defeasance clause
is significant and leads to a 25 basis reduction in yields. In model 4 we also include year fixed
effects. We find that including year dummies reduces our coefficient on covenant defeasance
to about 13 basis points. Nevertheless, our result is still statistically significant. Finally, we
include the mean and standard deviation of daily excess returns for the CRSP value-weighted
index in model 5 instead of using the RoA and RoA Volatility as proposed by Campbell and
Taksler (2003). Our estimates of the discount in YTM actually improves to 18 basis points
and is statistically significant.
A simple back of the envelope calculation shows that a 25 basis point reduction in yield
implies roughly a USD $0.94m reduction in annual interest rate payments given an average
rate of 7.6% and an average issue size of US $375m. If we consider the average reduction in
yield (over all 5 estimates) we are looking an an annual saving of US $0.71m. This amounts
roughly to a US $10.8m or US $8.2m reduction in lifetime payments respectively for the average
lifetime of a bond (using the average maturity of 11.5 years).
3.7 Endogeneity
Our model predicts that in equilibrium defeasable bonds are associated with an increase in the
number of covenants relative to bonds with no defeasance clause. Hence the firm’s covenant
structure and the inclusion of the covenant defeasance option are determined at the same time.
This relationship is also suggested in table 4 and table 5 where the defeasance option and the
number of covenants both show up as regressors and exogenous variables, respectively.
Hence we have to ask the question whether we are properly controlling for the effects of
this simultaneous decision. Interestingly however, there is no simultaneity bias because we
are simply considering the outcome of one single optimization problem. The fact that this
outcome has multiple aspects, i.e. the decision for the number of covenants and the decision
to include covenants, does not invalidate this point (Wooldridge (2002)). In an econometric
sense, the equations are not autonomous as they have no economic meaning in isolation from
each other. The failure of autonomy also means that the two equations in table 4 and table 5
should not be interpreted in a causal way.
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Why is that the case? Wooldridge (2002), Chapter 9, page 209, makes the following
point: “An equation in an simultaneous equation model should represent a causal relationship;
therefore we should be interested in varying each of the explanatory variables - including any
that are endogenous - while holding all the others fixed. Put another way, each equation in a
simultaneous equation model should represent some underlying conditional expectation that
has a causal structure.” The best example for such a system of simultaneous equations that
satisfies these two requirements is represented by the standard demand and supply equations
framework. Each equation represents the outcome of one distinctive optimization problem.
However, things are different once we consider the output of one single optimization prob-
lem: “Examples that fail the autonomy requirement often have the same feature: the endoge-
nous variables in the system are all choice variables of the same economic unit (Wooldridge
(2002), Chapter 9, page 210).” Clearly, in our setting the issuer chooses both defeasance and
the number of covenants, but they are, as argued above, the outcome of the same optimiza-
tion problem and hence there is no point in estimating a simultaneous equation model. Put
differently, we are estimating the shape of a multivalued supply equation that is governed by
one single underlying optimization problem and hence we do not face a simultaneity bias in
our regressions.
Instead Wooldridge (2002) recommends to simply estimate both regressions in a stand
alone way, which we have already done10
3.8 Robustness
3.8.1 Boilerplate Contracts
One central question with respect to any bond indenture is how standardized these agreements
are. One possibility is that all these covenants are ”boiler-plate” in the sense that there are
no individual variations across covenants. Alternatively, the inclusion of a particular covenant
may be the outcome of deliberate negotiations between the issuer, the underwriter and the
rating agency. A third possibility is that the wording of each covenant is done in a ”boiler-
plate” manner, but not the inclusion decision. To shed light on this question and rule out
that some underwriters operate in a ”boiler-plate” fashion, we look at how often underwriters
include defeasance provisions in their issues. If covenant defeasance were boilerplate, we would
expect underwriters to always or never include it, hence our distribution would resemble a
bi-modal distribution.
In table 8 we look at the empirical distribution of covenant defeasance clauses across un-
derwriters.11 For each underwriter we compute the mean for the inclusion of the covenant
defeasance clause across all issues underwritten by this particular entity. We then consider
the empirical distribution function across all underwriters. We find that the inclusion of the
10For another example of the same issue see Hochberg and Westerfield (2010).
11This information is included in the original FISD Mergent data but not in the WRDS version. We use the
original data with information on issues up to 2007 for this analysis.
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covenant defeasance option varies greatly across underwriters. This suggests that the defeasibil-
ity of a bond is the outcome of deliberate decision. In contrast, if the clause were ”boiler-plate”,
the distribution would have been bi-modal with most mass concentrated around zero and one.
FIGURE 1 displays the average use of the defeasance clause across underwriters and visualizes
the fact that the inclusion of the clause is deliberate rather than boilerplate.
3.8.2 Covenant Defeasance and Callability
In table 9 we report how callability and covenant defeasance interact. We find that conditional
on defeasance, most bonds can be called (81%). When we split the sample between bonds that
are continuously callable (similar to an American Call) and those that are not, we find roughly
52% can always be called. As continuous callability can substitute for covenant defeasance, we
look at whether there is a penalty (call premium or make-whole premium (Mergent (2004)))
to be paid for early bond retirement. We find that indeed almost all issues have to be called
at a premium. This make whole call premium is quite substantial, on average there is a 33
basis point premium on the call amount. Finally, we look at those bonds that cannot be called
continuously. We find that almost all of them have an initial quiet period through which the
issue cannot be called at all (2696 out of 2733). The length of the quiet period is on average
4.43 years or 45% of the average maturity of bonds in our sample. After the quiet period
almost all bonds can be called at market prices, not at par value. Moreover, as it well-known
that callable bonds pay higher rates than non-callable, whereas, as we have shown, defeasible
bonds pay a lower yield. Hence, in summary, callability does not appear to be a substitute for
the covenant defeasance clause in our sample.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we present a theoretical model and an empirical analysis of action-limiting
covenants and covenant defeasance options in corporate bonds. We show that when there is no
verifiable interim signal available, unconditional control rights can be made state-contingent by
granting the issuer the option to take control from the investor. For the contract to be optimal,
the exercise price must be set high enough so that the option is only exercised in the good state
of nature. The presence of this option makes control allocation ex post endogenous. Moreover,
our model predicts that the inclusion of the option to remove covenants makes issuers willing
to commit to more action-limiting or negative covenants in the contract at the time of issue.
Our theory implies that investors are willing to accept lower yield on a bond with such
option because they internalize the gains from the (partial) pre-payment of the bond upon
exercise in the good state and the gains from the issuer’s compliance with additional action-
limiting covenants in the bad state. Moreover, we identify issuer/bond characteristics that
predict the inclusion of a covenant defeasance clause in the bond contract.
Our empirical analysis of the covenant defeasance option in US corporate bonds supports
the predictions of our model in multiple ways. In particular, we find that the inclusion of
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a covenant defeasance option is associated with significantly more state-independent action-
limiting covenants in our sample of issuers of US corporate bonds. We also document that
the presence of the covenant defeasance option reduces the issue’s yield-to-maturity by 13 to
25 basis point on average. We report evidence supporting the predictions of our theory on
the characteristics of firms that issue defeasible bonds. We argue that defeasance options are
particularly important for firms with significant growth opportunities and for corporate bonds
for which renegotiation is very difficult.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Define pi ≡ σiH
(
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∑K
k=1 τkd
H
k
)
+ (1 − σiH)
(
νL +
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k=1 τkd
L
k
)
. Denote by qi = νi +∑K
k=1 τkd
i
k.
Then pH − pL = ∆σ∆ν + ∆σ
∑K
k=1 τk(d
H
k − dLk ) and we have:
∂L
∂Rb
= (α− 1)pH − λ∆p
∂L
∂dHk
= (τkR− γk)
(
1 + λ
∆σ
σHH
)
+ (α− 1)
(
1− pH
∆p
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σHH
)
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∂L
∂dLk
= (τkR− γk)
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1− λ ∆σ
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)
+ (α− 1)
(
1 +
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∆p
∆σ
1− σHH
)
τkRb
The equation implies that λ = (α−1)pH∆p . Similarly to before λ = 0 is impossible and α > 1.
Let us substitute λ in the other partial derivatives,
∂L
∂dHk
= τkR− γk + (α− 1)
[
τkRb +
pH
∆p
∆σ
σHH
(τk (R−Rb)− γk)
]
∂L
∂dLk
= τkR− γk + (α− 1)
[
τkRb − pH∆p
∆σ
1− σHH (τk (R−Rb)− γk)
]
Let us show that 1 < pH∆p
∆σ
σHH
. Indeed, this is equivalent to:
∆pσHH < pH∆σ
⇔ pHσLH < pLσHH
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This is equivalent to:
(qL + σHH(qH − qL))σLH < (qL + σLH(qH − qL))σHH
or σLH < σHH , which is true. As ∂L∂dHk
≥ 0, iff
(τkR− γk)
(
1 + (α− 1) pH
∆p
∆σ
σHH
)
+ (α− 1)
(
1− pH
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σHH
)
τkRb ≥ 0
⇔ τkR
γk
≥ 1− (α− 1)
1− pH∆p ∆σσHH(
1 + (α− 1)pH∆p ∆σσHH
) τkRb
γk
there will some decisions for which τkRγk ≥ 1 and
∂L
∂dHk
≤ 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2:
• Take:
∂L
∂dLk
= τkR− γk + (α− 1)
[
τkRb − pH∆p
∆σ
1− σHH (τk (R−Rb)− γk)
]
This can be rewritten as
∂L
∂dLk
= (τkR− γk)
(
1− (α− 1) pH
∆p
∆σ
1− σHH
)
+ (α− 1)
(
1− pH
∆p
∆σ
1− σHH
)
τkRb
and so ∂L
∂dLk
≥ 0, iff
(τkR− γk)
(
1− (α− 1) pH
∆p
∆σ
1− σHH
)
≥ −(α− 1)
(
1− pH
∆p
∆σ
1− σHH
)
τkRb
Notice first that
1− pH
∆p
∆σ
1− σHH ≥ 0⇔
(pH − pL)(1− σHH)− pH∆σ ≥ 0⇔
∆σ∆q(1− σHH)− pH∆σ ≥ 0⇔
∆q(1− σHH)− (qL + σHH∆q) ≥ 0⇔
qH − qL − σHHqH + qLσHH − qL − σHHqH + σHHqL ≥ 0⇔
qH ≥ 0
which is true. There are potentially two cases to consider.
• Case 1: 1− (α− 1)pH∆p ∆σ1−σHH ≥ 0. Then, we have that ∂L∂dLk ≥ 0, iff
τkR
γk
≥ 1−
(α− 1)
(
1− pH∆p ∆σ1−σHH
)
τkRb(
1− (α− 1)pH∆p ∆σ1−σHH
)
γk
There will decisions for which τkRγk < 1 but still d
L
k = 1. This implies k
∗
L > k
∗.
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• Case 2: 1− (α− 1) pH∆p ∆σ1−σHH < 0. Then, we have that ∂L∂dLk ≥ 0, iff
τkR
γk
≤ 1−
(α− 1)
(
1− pH∆p ∆σ1−σHH
)
τkRb(
(α− 1)pH∆p ∆σ1−σHH − 1
)
γk
and then we would give in fact control over the decisions from k̂ to K, with k̂ > k∗.
Notice though that for all k,
σHH
∂L
∂dHk
+ (1− σHH) ∂L
∂dLk
= τkR− γk + (α− 1)τkRb
Therefore,
σHH
∂L
∂dHk
+ (1− σHH) ∂L
∂dLk
≥ 0⇔
τkR
γk
≥ 1− (α− 1)τkRb
γk
Take a decision k for which τkRγk ≥ 1. Then we cannot have both d
H
k = 0 and d
L
k = 0
as the last inequality implies that at least one of the partial derivative must be positive.
But we have seen that necessarily k∗H ≤ k∗. Moreover if case 2 obtains, we would have
decisions between k∗ and k̂ where dLk = 0. So for those decisions, we would have both
dHk = 0 and d
L
k = 0, a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
Suppose this is not true, i.e. k∗L < k˜. Since k˜ > k
∗ ≥ k∗H , this implies that the financier has
control over fewer than k˜ decisions in both states of the world. This contradicts that k˜ is the
optimal number of decisions over which the financier should have control. 
Proof of Proposition 4:
Suppose first that
(νH +
k∗H∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb) >
k∗L∑
k=k∗H
τkRb
The expected payoff to the firm in the the high state if the firm exercises the option to remove
covenants is the firm’s gross profit minus the payment to the lender, minus the price of the
exercise.
(νH +
k∗H∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb) +
k∗H∑
k=1
γkd
H
k − (νL +
k∗H∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb) = ∆ν(R−Rb)−
k∗H∑
k=1
γkd
H
k
If the firm did not exercise the option, it would receive
30
(νH +
k˜∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb)−
k˜∑
k=1
γkd
H
k
The firm prefers to exercise the option if
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The same logic completes the proof for the case when
k∗L∑
k=k∗H
τkRb ≥ (νH +
k∗H∑
k=1
τkd
H
k )(R−Rb). 
Proof of Proposition 5:
Compare the individual rationality conditions for B∗ and B∗∗ and assume that R∗b and R
∗∗
b
are equal (we denote them by Rb.
The individual rationality condition for B∗,
σHH
νH + k˜∑
k=1
τkdk
Rb + (1− σHH)
νL + k˜∑
k=1
τkdk
Rb ≥ I −A. (13)
For B∗∗,
σHH
νH + k∗H∑
k=1
τkd
H
k
Rb + σHH max{
νL + k˜∑
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H
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 (R−Rb); k∗L∑
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τkRb}
+(1− σHH)
νL + k∗L∑
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τkd
L
k
Rb ≥ I −A. (14)
Since P ≥∑k∗Lk=k∗H τkRb, the sum of the first two components on the left-hand side in (14)
exceeds the first component on the left-hand side of (13).
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It is straightforward to see that if
∑k∗L
k=k∗H
τkRb ≥
(
νL +
∑k˜
k=1 τkd
H
k
)
(R−Rb), then the dif-
ference, σHH
∑k∗L
k˜
τkRb is positive since k∗L > k˜, and if
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is even more positive.
Moreover, since k∗L > k˜, third ( and last) component on the left-hand side of (14) exceeds
the second (and last) component on the left-hand side of (13).
Hence, if RB is the same for both bonds, then the left-hand side of (14) exceeds the
left-hand side of (13). Since optimality (efficiency) requires that the financier’s individual
rationality constraint be binding, B∗∗ must promise a lower yield than B∗, R∗b ≥ R∗∗b . 
Proof of Proposition 6:
Assuming that the financier breaks even on both bonds, and setting the left-hand sides of
the corresponding individual rationality conditions equal, we get
σHH(νH +
k˜∑
k=1
τk)Rb∗ + (1− σHH)(νL +
k˜∑
k=1
τk)Rb∗ =
σHH(νH +
k∗H∑
k=1
τk)Rb∗∗ + σHHP ∗ + (1− σHH)(νL +
k∗L∑
k=1
τk)Rb∗∗,
or
σHH(νH +
k˜∑
k=1
τk)(Rb∗ −Rb∗∗) + (1− σHH)(νL +
k˜∑
k=1
τk)(Rb∗ −Rb∗∗) =
−σHH
k˜∑
k=k∗H
τkRb∗∗ + σHHP ∗ + (1− σHH)
k∗L∑
k=k˜
τk)Rb∗∗
Denote by h the difference between Rb∗ and Rb∗∗ and define ν = σHHνH + (1 − σHH)νL.
Then, the above expression can be rewritten as
h(ν +
k˜∑
k=1
τk) = −σHH
k˜∑
k=k∗H
τkRb∗∗ + σHHP ∗ + (1− σHH)
k∗L∑
k=k˜
Rb∗∗
Then, solving for h, we get
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h =
σHHP
∗ − σHH
∑k˜
k=k∗H
τkRb∗∗ + (1− σHH)
∑kL∗
k=k˜
τkRb∗∗
ν +
∑k˜
k=1 τk
.
as claimed. 
Proof of Proposition 7:
Assume that either (6) or (7) is violated. Then, compare the individual rationality conditions
for B∗ and B∗∗ as in Proposition 5 assuming that RB is the same. The individual rationality
condition for B∗ is identical to (13) in the proof of Proposition 5.
Since either (6) or (7) is violated, the option in B∗∗ will never be exercised. To distinguish
this bond from the one with a potentially exercisable option, we introduce the notation BN∗∗
for this bond. The individual rationality condition for the financier of BN∗∗ becomes
σHH
νH + k∗L∑
k=1
τkd
H
k
Rb + (1− σHH)
νL + k∗L∑
k=1
τkd
L
k
Rb ≥ I −A. (15)
If RB is the same for both bonds, the left-hand side of (15) exceeds the left-hand side of
(13). Since optimality requires that the financier’s individual rationality constraint be binding,
BN∗∗ will promise a lower yield than B∗, that is, R∗b ≥ RN∗∗b . A further comparison of the
individual rationality conditions for B∗∗ and BN∗∗ shows that the yield on a bond with a
potentially exercisable option to take control is at least as low or lower than the yield on a
bond with an option that will never be exercised, i.e. RN∗∗b ≥ R∗∗b .
Next we show that regardless of R∗b ≥ RN∗∗b , firms will issue bonds with irrevocable
covenants, B∗ when either (6) or (7) is violated. Since the optimal among bonds with ir-
revocable covenants grants k˜ decsions to the financier, giving control the financier over k∗L ≥ k˜
is suboptimal.
By granting k∗L decisions to the financier the issuer gains the difference between the left-
hand sides of (15) and (13), which is
∑k∗L
k=k˜
τkd
H
k R
∗
b . In exchange they give up
∑k∗L
k=k˜
γk. Since
γk ≥ τkR for all k > k∗ and k˜ ≥ k∗, the issuer prefers the optimal bond with irrevocable
covenants, B∗. 
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Tables
Table 1: Bond Issuance: Summary Statistics
Number of Bonds per Firm
N 1 2 3 4 > 4
Firms 5138 1267 441 161 154
Issue Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Full Sample
Amount 358216 1873551 1 100000000 10584
Price 98.31 7.44 17.04 109.73 6750
Offering Yield 7.5 2.17 0 25.75 6590
Treasury Spread 128.45 113.55 0 1501 6166
Callable 0.73 0.45 0 1 10584
Offering Year 1999 5.05 1981 2008 10584
Maturity (in Years) 12.65 10.42 1 100 10584
Rating 17.67 7.36 1 27 9306
Defeasance 0.68 0.47 0 1 10582
Asset ale Restrictions 1.66 0.8 0 3 10582
Debt Issuance Restrictions 0.49 0.65 0 3 10582
Total Number of Covenants 6.10 3.05 0 17 10582
No Defeasance
Amount 321386 1376286 2250 55000000 3392
Price 99.14 4.54 19.87 108.49 2901
Offering Yield 7.35 1.97 0 25.75 2806
Treasury Spread 103.55 85.21 0 1362.3 2673
Callable 0.58 0.49 0 1 3392
Offering Year 1997 5.23 1981 2008 3392
Maturity (in Years) 15.13 11.89 1 100 3392
Rating 15.73 8.27 1 27 2833
Asset ale Restrictions 1.12 0.81 0 3 3392
Debt Issuance Restrictions 0.21 0.48 0 3 3392
Total Number of Covenants 4.31 2.35 0 14 3392
Defeasance
Amount 375637 2067118 1 100000000 7190
Price 97.68 8.98 17.04 109.73 3847
Offering Yield 7.60 2.31 0 18.5 3782
Treasury Spread 147.54 127.94 0 1501 3492
Callable 0.81 0.4 0 1 7190
Offering Year 2000 4.62 1985 2008 7190
Maturity (in Years) 11.48 9.43 1 100 7190
Rating 18.52 6.75 1 27 6471
Asset ale Restrictions 1.92 0.65 0 3 7190
Debt Issuance Restrictions 0.62 0.68 0 3 7190
Total Number of Covenants 6.95 2.97 0 17 7190
Notes: In this table we look at a sample of 10584 US long-term industrial corporate
bonds found in the FISD database issued between 1980 and 2008. The data excludes
issues for which no covenant information was available, such as medium-term notes.
Also, financial firms or utilities are excluded form the sample. In the first panel we
present information about how frequently firms issue bonds. In the second panel we
present summary statistics for the complete sample. We then split the sample into
two parts, the third panel shows the subsample of bonds that come with a covenant
defeasance clause, while the fourth panel shows the subsample of bonds that come
without defeasance. We provide information about the offering amount, the issue
price, the yield as of the offering date, the spread over a comparable treasury bond,
whether the bond is callable and whether there are covenants attached to the bond.
the year the bond was issued, its maturity in years, it’s rating on a numerical scale
from 1 (AAA) to 21 (C) and whether the bond can be defeased or not.
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Table 4: Defeasance: Number of Covenants
Notes: We run Poisson and OLS regressions with the number of covenants as the dependent variable. Following
Billet, King, and Mauer (2007) we aggregate related covenants. We focus on three specifications: First we
consider debt issuance restrictions where we consider the sum of the following debt issuance restrictions: (max
4, sum of Funded Debt (ir3), Indebtedness (ir4), Senior Debt Issuance (ir11), and Subordinated Debt Issuance
(ir14)). Second we consider asset sale restrictions (maximum 3, sum of Asset Sale Clause (bh18), Sales Leaseback
(ir9), and Sales Assets (ir10)). Finally we focus on the total number of covenants found in the bond. In
specification 1, 3, and 5 we run a poisson regression and report average partial effects. In specification 2, 4, and
6 we run an OLS model with year, rating and industry controls (1-digit SIC codes). We relate our dependent
variables to explanatory factors that have been proposed by Billet, King, and Mauer (2007), Reisel (2004)
and Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2007) to be relevant for the inclusion of covenants in an issue. We report
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 for the Poisson regressions and Adjusted R2 in the case of OLS. Following Petersen
(2008) standard errors clustered around firms are in parentheses.
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
Debt Issuance Asset Sale Number of Covs
Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Defeasance 0.15∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.14) (0.12)
Term Spread 0.01 0.02∗ -0.009 0.02 -0.05∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Credit Spread -0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.07 -0.29∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.15) (0.18)
Maturity 0.005 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.0004 -0.05∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005)
Maturity2 -.0007 0.0000332∗∗∗ 0.0000652∗∗∗ 0.000011 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0000119) (0.0000249) (0.0000186) (0.0000704) (0.000048)
Issue Size 0.0000907∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0000665 0.0000919 0.0009∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000049) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0005)
RoA -0.23∗ -0.42∗∗ -0.07 -0.068∗∗∗ -1.41∗ -2.93∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.19) (0.24) (0.23) (0.78) (0.87)
RoA Volatility -0.20 0.04 1.16∗∗∗ 0.42 0.87 0.57
(0.24) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (1.33) (1.55)
Cash 0.31∗∗∗ 0.21 0.28 0.54∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.14) (0.2) (0.19) (0.66) (0.68)
Cash Flow 0.007∗∗ 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 0.03∗ 0.02
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.02) (0.02)
Market to Book 0.06 0.46 0.51 0.74 1.10 2.19
(0.16) (0.3) (0.37) (0.47) (1.38) (1.77)
log(MarketCap) -0.10∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.59∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
EBIT -0.007∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ -0.004 -0.002 -0.01 -.001
(0.002) (0.0009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Investments 0.26∗∗ 0.32∗ 0.58∗ 0.62∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 1.52∗
(0.12) (0.18) (0.32) (0.32) (0.71) (0.83)
Fixed Assets -0.04 -0.010 -0.47∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗ -0.70∗∗ -0.63∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.1) (0.3) (0.28)
Book Leverage -0.008 -0.31 -0.69∗ -0.85∗ -0.99 -1.73
(0.17) (0.31) (0.38) (0.46) (1.38) (1.72)
Seniority -0.29∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ 0.02 0.09∗ -1.05∗∗∗ -0.91∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.14)
Rating 0.01∗∗∗ 0.003 0.04∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.009)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Rating FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 4070 4070 4070 4070 4070 4070
R2 0.25 0.56 0.01 0.30 0.13 0.60
Table 5: Inclusion of Defeasance
Notes: We run Logit and OLS regressions with the defeasance as the dependent variable. Defeasance takes
value one when such a clause is found in an issue and zero otherwise. Our main independent variables are
debt issuance restrictions, asset sale restrictions as well as the total number of covenants included in the issue.
We follow Billet, King, and Mauer (2007) and first consider only related covenants: Debt Issuance Restrictions
(maximum 4, sum of Funded Debt (ir3), Indebtedness (ir4), Senior Debt Issuance (ir11), and Subordinated Debt
Issuance (ir14)) and Asset Sale Restrictions (maximum 3, sum of Asset Sale Clause (bh18), Sales Leaseback
(ir9), and Sales Assets (ir10)). In specification 1, 3, and 5 we run a logit regression and report average partial
effects. In specification 2, 4, and 6 we run an OLS model with year, rating and industry controls (1-digit SIC
codes). We relate our dependent variable to explanatory factors that have been proposed by Billet, King, and
Mauer (2007), Reisel (2004) and Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2007) to be relevant for the inclusion of covenants
in an issue. We report McFadden’s Pseudo R2 for the Logit regressions and Adjusted R2 in the case of OLS.
Following Petersen (2008) standard errors clustered around firms are in parentheses.
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
Defeasance
Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Debt Issuance Restrictions 0.11∗∗∗ 0.04∗
(0.03) (0.02)
Asset Sale Restrictions 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Total Number of Covenants 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Term Spread 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Credit Spread 0.003 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Maturity -0.0007 0.002 -0.0009 0.002 -0.0004 0.003∗
(0.0007) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.001)
Maturity2 -0.000029∗ -0.0000283∗ -0.0000312∗
(0.0000169) (0.0000167) (0.0000168)
Issue Size 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗
(0.0000671) (0.000062) (0.0000631)
Seniority -0.04 -0.07∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
RoA 0.23 0.13 0.16 0.2 0.24 0.18
(0.2) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15)
RoA Volatility 0.97∗∗ 0.29 0.6 0.23 0.77∗ 0.27
(0.49) (0.27) (0.44) (0.27) (0.45) (0.26)
Cash 0.22 0.04 0.2 -0.03 0.13 -0.02
(0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13)
Cash-Flow -0.01 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.01 -0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Market to Book -0.13 0.04 -0.13 -0.04 -0.19 0.005
(0.26) (0.18) (0.24) (0.18) (0.28) (0.18)
log(MarketCap) -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.02 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EBIT 0.0007 0.0004 0.002 0.0008 0.0008 0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Investments 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.25 0.08 0.3
(0.23) (0.2) (0.21) (0.19) (0.22) (0.2)
Fixed Assets -0.27∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗ -0.19∗∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.22∗∗ -0.20∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Book Leverage -0.04 -0.19 0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.16
(0.28) (0.2) (0.26) (0.2) (0.28) (0.19)
Rating -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Rating FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 4087 4070 4087 4070 4087 4070
R2 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.14
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Table 7: Yield Regressions
Notes: Following the methodology in Campbell and Taksler (2003), we run an OLS regression with the Yield
to Maturity (YTM) from FISD as the left hand variable and defeasance as the right hand variable. Each
regression includes issue characterizes, firm characteristics and both the term and credit spread: Y TM =
β1 · defeasance+ β2 · FirmControls+ β3 · IssueControls+ δ1 · OtherControls+ i. In Model 1 we only
include issue characteristics, including the firm’s rating and both the term and credit spread. We use pre-
issue ratings. Model 2 also includes firm characteristics. Model 3 includes a FE for each rating category and
a FE for each maturity. Model 4 includes a year fixed effect and includes a pre-1996 dummy, controlling
for changes in the accounting treatment of in-substance defeasance (as described in FASB (1996)). Finally,
model 5 differs from model 4 as we replace RoA and RoA Volatility with Equity returns and the standard
deviation of equity returns. Following Petersen (2008) we report standard errors clustered around years and
at the issuer level in parentheses, where the first row reports standard errors corrected for year clustering.
Significance levels are indicated for standard errors clustered around issuers.
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
Yield to Maturity
Base1 Base2 Full Time TimeAlt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Defeasance -.22∗∗ -.17∗ -.25∗∗ -.13∗ -.18∗∗
(0.12) (0.11) (0.1) (0.07) (0.08)
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.07) (0.08)
Term Spread 0.04 -.01 -.09 0.34∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.1) (0.1) (0.18) (0.18)
(0.03) (0.03) (0.1) (0.18) (0.05)
Credit Spread -.24 -.11 0.3 0.91∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.4) (0.37) (0.2) (0.22)
(0.18) (0.17) (0.37) (0.2) (0.25)
log(Maturity) 0.73∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22)
(0.11) (0.09)
Issue Size 0.002∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 -.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009)
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001)
Seniority 0.22 -.07 -.08 -.03 -.21
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
(0.18) (0.2) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21)
Number of Covenants 0.35∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Rating 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
(0.008) (0.007)
RoA -4.16∗∗∗ -4.38∗∗∗ -3.78∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.64) (0.5)
(0.81) (0.64) (0.5)
RoA Volatility -.98 0.02 0.41
(1.62) (1.75) (1.44)
(1.85) (1.75) (1.44)
Equity Returns 0.14
(0.12)
(0.15)
Equity SD 0.65∗∗∗
(0.12)
(0.19)
Firm Level Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Maturity FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes Yes
N 1980 1863 1863 1863 1437
R2 0.46 0.52 0.56 0.7 0.7
Table 8: Defeasance: Usage across underwriters
Obs 318 Percentiles Value Percentiles Value
Min 0 1% 0.00 75% 0.47
Max 1 5% 0.09 90% 0.51
Mean 0.38 10% 0.23 95% 0.54
Std. Dev. 0.13 25% 0.29 99% 0.60
50% 0.42
Notes: We look at the empirical distribution of defeasance
across underwriters. For each underwriter we compute the
mean for the use of defeasance across all issues underwritten
by this particular entity. We then consider the empirical
distribution function across all underwriters.
Figure 1: The Average Use of Defeasance across Underwriters
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Table 9: Callability as Substitute for Defeasance?
Defeasance: Yes (7190)
No Yes
# % # %
Callable 1406 0.19 5784 0.81
Continuously Callable 2733 0.48 3022 0.52
Continuously Callable at premium 43 0.00 2979 1.00
#
# Mean Median
Call Premium = Make Whole Spread in BP 2911 33.26 30
No Yes
# % # %
Not Continuously Callable have Quiet Period upfront 37 0.00 2696 1.00
# Mean Median
Length of quiet Period in years 2696 4.43 4.60
# %
Length of quiet Period relative to maturity (in %) 2696 45% 47%
Market Price Par Others
Call Price 2979 2750 127 102
Notes: In this table we look at how callability and defeasance interact. Conditionally
on defeasance being present we first check how many bonds are callable. We then check
whether we have an American Exercise setup (continuous) or a European (discrete). For
those issues that are continuously callable we check whether this comes with a prepayment
penalty (call premium or make-whole premium (Mergent (2004)). Finally, we look at the
premium to be paid. For those issues that are not continuously callable we check whether
they have a quiet period before the call can be exercised for the first time. We then compute
the length of the quiet period in years and as a percentage of the issue’s maturity.
Table 10: Sample Construction
Sample construction
All FISD Issuesr (31/12/2008) 11837
Keep Industrials and Telecom Firms -4207
Keep US Issuers -1896
=5734
Match with corresponding issues =33401
- Drop Canadian Issues in the US -8
- Drop Non-US issues in the US -4
Keep Debentures -7109
Keep if Subsequent Info available -6040
Keep if Public Issue (no rule 144 PP) -3655
Use Bond Type table to eliminate:
Remaining MTNs: -5341
Private Placements -25
No Preferred Securities -2
US Corporate Debentures =10584
Merge with rating table =9596
Merge with Compustat (Cusip) =4856
Compustat variable definitions
EBIT (Earnings before Interest and Taxes) =ib
Cash =che/at
Cash Flow =(ib+dp)/ppe
Market Capitalization =prcc c*csho
RoA (Return on Assets) =oibdp/at
Investments =capx/at
Leverage =(at-seq)/at
Market-to-Book Ratio =(at-ceq+MarketCap)/at
Fixed Assets =ppent/at
Z-Score = 3.3*EBIT/at+sale/at+1.4*re/at+
1.2*(act-lct)/at+0.6*MarketCap/(dltt+dlc)
Notes: This table describes how we construct our sample from the universe of bond issues collected
in FISD. As we are only interested in public (non-convertible) corporate US debentures issued
we eliminate various Non-US and Non-Corporate issues. In the second part of the table we
describe our definitions of various variables based on Compustat items. We use the new Xpressfeed
definitions rather than the old numerical data items.
